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THE ORGANIC CRISIS OF THE LIBERAL STATE IN SPAIN: 
BETWEEN THE CATALAN QUAGMIRE AND THE RED 
SPECTRE, 1918-19 
FRANCISCO J. ROMERO SALVADÓ 
(University of Bristol) 
Abstract 
Drawing upon a vast array of primary sources, this article focuses on a key period of modern 
Spanish history: November 1918-April 1919. In the aftermath of WW1 and spurred on by the 
Allied victory, demands by Catalonia’s political elites for greater autonomy seized the 
country’s agenda. However, the political tussle between the centre and the Catalan elites 
ended a few months later with their mutual defeat. The upsurge of labour agitation and the 
hopes of the proletariat generated by the Bolshevik Revolution combined with bourgeois fear 
resulted in the question of national identity being superseded by bitter class conflict. This 
article conveys the thesis that these crucial months crystalized the organic crisis of the ruling 
liberal regime. Indeed, the outcome of these events proved its fragile foundations, dashed 
hopes for a reformist and negotiated solution and constituted a dress rehearsal for the military 
coup of 1923, a clear example of the reactionary backlash which swept across Europe in the 
interwar years. 
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I. The Crisis of the Traditional Liberal State 
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This article seeks to further the debate on the decay (but also resilience) of the Restoration 
Monarchy in Spain (1874-1923). A related objective is to enlighten the wider European 
framework of this crucial moment. Despite its peculiarities, the Spanish example was a 
regional version of the crisis of traditional regimes that engulfed Europe in the aftermath of 
the Great War, a watershed period when, in the face of unprecedented social protest, 
incumbent governing elites saw their hegemony challenged in the dawning era of mass 
politics. 
 By the turn of the century, in most European countries, behind the façade of 
parliamentarian forms of government, crowned sovereigns, far from being mere figureheads, 
conserved vital prerogatives. They were backed by royalist armies and bureaucracies. Save 
for Great Britain, the primary sector still generated the largest proportion of the gross national 
product. A variety of mechanisms (narrow franchises, clientelism, disproportionate electoral 
weight given to rural areas, etc.) favoured the manufacture of docile majorities.1 In Southern 
Europe, Italy’s trasformismo or Portugal’s rotativismo represented the local variety of 
oligarchic liberalism. In Spain, constitutional trappings concealed the monopoly of power 
held by a governing elite. Two dynastic parties – Conservatives and Liberals - succeeded 
systematically in office in a practice known as the turno pacífico (peaceful rotation) through a 
combination of widespread apathy and ballot-rigging organized by the local caciques 
(bigwigs) who in return ran their localities as private fiefdoms.2 
 Traditionally, the loss of the overseas empire (Cuba, the Philippines, Puerto Rico, 
etc.) in a war against the United States in 1898 was seen as a fatal blow to the hegemony of 
the regime.3 However, the avalanche of publications during its centenary challenged that 
thesis. For instance, José Álvarez Junco suggested that ‘the so-called disaster was an 
exaggerated perception of events, experienced as a collective disgrace of apocalyptic 
proportions’.4 Sebastian Balfour noted how in a largely unmodernised society with poor 
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communications and high rates of illiteracy, the traditional networks of social control 
continued to function.5 
 It was the Great War that proved to be a watershed. Although spared from the human 
ordeal due to her neutrality, Spain experienced unprecedented levels of socio-economic 
upheaval and its governing classes were challenged with demands for genuine political 
reform and the fast-advancing threat of revolution. In 1917, the country went through a 
revolutionary cycle which included the revolt of military officers in June, an assembly of 
dissident parliamentarians in July and a revolutionary strike headed by the socialists in 
August which was crushed by the army. The simultaneous fragmentation of the two dynastic 
parties and the end of the turno pacífico led some scholars to suggest that the regime emerged 
from that challenge alive but in a state of coma.6 However, nothing was predetermined. It 
lasted for nearly six more years and proved remarkably adept at clinging onto power. 
 Some authors have viewed the military quagmire in which Spain found itself in 
Morocco, particularly after the disastrous retreat at Annual in the summer of 1921, as the 
event that brought about the final demise of the regime.7 Notwithstanding the importance of 
the Moroccan question, this article argues that the cause of the collapse of the constitutional 
order was the social warfare which materialized in earnest in the first months of 1919. In fact, 
Spain faced the same challenges as other countries where similar regimes also finally 
succumbed.8 
 Contemplating the embattled Restoration Monarchy, British Intelligence wondered 
whether a leopard could ever change its spots: the potentiality within the monarchist elites to 
undertake thorough internal reform to strengthen its foundations.9 Raymond Carr suggested 
that when the regime was overthrown in 1923, General Miguel Primo de Rivera claimed to be 
finishing off ‘a diseased body’ when in fact he strangled a ‘new birth’, one evolving towards 
democracy.10 Such a statement produced a wide-ranging debate that overlaps with the crucial 
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question of the troubled transition from elite to mass politics and Europe’s crisis of 
modernity.11 In recent years, some scholars have stressed the need to re-evaluate the liberal 
regime, avoiding Manichean notions of it being merely a corrupt system only responsive to 
the interests of a narrow oligarchy. They stressed the ruling order’s quasi-democratic 
connotations by arguing that it possessed a degree of representation, defended civil liberties 
and proved able to absorb persons and groups outside the system.12 
 Largely overlooked by scholarship13, an analysis of the period from November 1918 
to April 1919 offers an important contribution to the debate. Rather than the aforementioned 
revolutionary convulsions of 1917, this was the moment when the organic crisis of the 
Liberal state crystallized. It was not only challenged from below but also rejected by sectors 
of the dominant economic classes (particularly in Catalonia).14 By analysing in depth these 
months, this article confirms the scepticism that the regime could respond successfully (not 
from unwillingness but rather inability) to the situation brought about by the Great War. In 
November 1918, a vast campaign in favour of Catalan autonomy began. Overshadowed three 
months later by the eruption of massive class conflict, the government showed enough 
flexibility to address both challenges. However, perceiving liberal politics as bankrupt to 
solve the crucial issues of national unity and public order, the powerful garrison in Barcelona 
stepped in. The ‘praetorian solution’ imposed during the ‘hot spring of 1919’ constituted a 
dress rehearsal for the coup staged four years later. It was also an example of the violent 
reaction experienced by Europe in the interwar years. 
II. The Lliga’s Offensive 
The crisis which reached its peak in the spring of 1919 began with an offensive led by the 
Lliga Regionalista de Catalunya (Lliga). The hegemonic voice of Catalanism,15 the Lliga 
formed part of the nation-wide movement of regeneration which sprang up after 1898.16 
Revisionist scholars such as Charles Ehlrich have argued against its being the political 
The Organic Crisis of the Liberal State in Spain (November 1918-April 1919) 
5 
 
instrument of the Catalan industrial bourgeoisie. Indeed, the Catalan economic elites did not 
confine themselves to one party. However, their influence in the Lliga cannot be 
underestimated: it counted the largest number of industrialists and businessmen amongst its 
leadership and its propaganda was significantly biased towards the ‘creators of wealth’.17 
 From its inception in 1901, the Lliga, a nationalist and social-conservative force with 
strong Catholic roots and reformist ideals, presented endemic contradictions. Its stress was on 
liberation from centralist oppression as part of the 19th century struggle of small nations in 
Europe (Poland, Hungary, Finland, etc.). However, its leaders also had an imperialist goal. 
Given the perceived disregard for industrial interests and pandering to the southern landed 
estates by the authorities, they defended an ‘Espanya Catalana’: Spain could only regain its 
past greatness as a nation-state of ‘nations’ led by an economically advanced Catalonia and 
its modernizing elites.18 It was thus imperative to destroy the grip held by the turno pacífico. 
This feeling was exposed by its leader Francesc Cambó: 
We represent a unique case in Spanish and even European politics: we spend our time 
fighting governments. Yet I must tell you sincerely that we are a group of men of 
government, who have been born to govern, who are prepared to govern, who have 
shown skills to govern, and nevertheless we seem doomed to remain in opposition.19 
As a ‘party of order’, the Lliga viscerally preferred a gradualist strategy. Being a mass force 
born on the back of a protest movement facilitated alliances with other parties with which to 
lead carefully-choreographed pressure campaigns upon the regime. However, its instinctive 
conservatism always ultimately prevailed. This was confirmed in the spring of 1919: it 
abandoned, for the sake of social order, its pro-autonomy campaign and backed the army, the 
obvious embodiment of Spain’s ‘sacred’ unity, against their common enemy, the labour 
movement. 
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 The Lliga rapidly made an impact in the political arena. After destroying the 
monarchist grip on local politics in Barcelona the very year of its foundation in 1901, it 
fought for control of city hall power with diverse republican parties, particularly Alejandro 
Lerroux’s Radical Party whose success was based on the electoral support from broad sectors 
of the working classes. After the violent anti-clerical riots and subsequent repression in the 
summer of 1909 (Tragic Week), the divorce between Lerroux and the proletariat cleared the 
field of meaningful competitors.20 In April 1914, the concession by Royal Decree of the 
Mancomunitat, created by the merger of the four Catalan Diputacions (provincial councils) 
which re-established Catalonia’s territorial unity and offered considerable administrative 
resources, facilitated the Lliga’s pursuit of its domestic agenda. Under Enric Prat de la Riba 
and after his death in 1917 by Josep Puig i Cadafalch, the Mancomunitat developed a set of 
distinctively Catalan institutions: Biblioteca de Catalunya (Library of Catalonia), L’Escola 
Industrial (Industrial School), L’Escola Superior de Belles Arts (Higher School of Fine Arts), 
L’Escola de l’Administració Local (School of Local Administration), etc.21 
 The Great War catapulted the Lliga to the centre of national politics. Spain’s 
neutrality gave her economy an unexpected boost as the drastic reduction of competition in 
the domestic market and thriving external demand produced an unprecedented boom. With its 
textile mills and metallurgical factories working around the clock, Barcelona confirmed its 
powerhouse status within a largely agrarian country.22 Spurred on by the growing weight of 
the Catalan economy, the Lliga felt strong enough to pursue its grand design to claim a stake 
in state power. 
 Monarchist infighting favoured the Lliga’s ambitions. When the Liberal Party’ 
flamboyant rising star, Santiago Alba at the Home Office, masterminded a comprehensive 
coalition in Catalonia (including professed enemies of the monarchy such as Lerroux’s 
republicans) for the April 1916 elections, Prat de la Riba saw it as the confirmation of the 
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traditional Liberal hatred of Catalanism.23 Emboldened by the triumphal campaign, 
conducted under the slogan Per Catalunya i l’Espanya Gran’ (For Catalonia and a Greater 
Spain), in which the Lliga emerged as the largest Catalan force,24 its parliamentarian minority 
tabled, for the first time, the question of Catalan self-government. Although rejected in the 
chamber, the then Prime Minister, Count Romanones, recognized the existence of a ‘Catalan 
question’.25 Soon thereafter, the Catalanists went on to inflict a massive defeat on Alba and, 
in the process, destroyed his hopes of leading his party. Having moved to the Treasury, 
Alba’s introduction of a vast plan of national reconstruction, to be paid for by a windfall tax 
on war profits earned by industry and trade but ignoring those made by agriculture, 
transformed the Lliga into the champions of industrial interests and leaders of a national 
campaign that wrecked his plans and further divided the Liberal Party.26 
 In 1917, the Lliga took advantage of the political vacuum that followed the successful 
military refusal to disband the Juntas Militares de Defensa (military trade unions created in 
1916 to defend the corps’ collective interests) and the subsequent downfall of the Liberal 
government then led by the Marquis of Alhucemas, and the hasty return of the Conservatives 
under Eduardo Dato.27 The Catalanists emerged then as the soul of the Restoration’s most 
important reformist attempt: the summoning in Barcelona, on 19 July, of an assembly of 
dissident parliamentarians to initiate the process of constitutional reform.28 On 26 October, the 
army, after having crushed a workers’ general strike in August, asked the monarch to entrust 
power to a government more representative of the national will while guaranteeing the 
dissolution of any parliament that challenged the throne.29 After eight days of bargaining, the 
Lliga’s sudden about-turn (acceptance of portfolios in a cabinet in Madrid that effectively meant 
the end of the turno pacífico) was felt as a betrayal by its former assembly partners. Rather than 
storming the dynastic citadel, it settled for joining it.30 
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 On 3 November 1917, a monarchist coalition including two Catalanist ministers - 
Joan Ventosa (Finance) and Felipe Rodés (Education) – was established. In early February 
1918, an enthusiastic Cambó argued that the Lliga’s duty was to rule in Spain with Catalonia 
taking the role of Prussia in the Iberian kingdoms.31 In March 1918, his stellar moment 
arrived when amidst a massive civil servants’ strike, the king heeded his advice to appoint a 
national government.32 Under the Restoration’s most influential statesman, Antonio Maura, it 
gathered the leaders of the faction-riddled dynastic parties and two members of the Lliga: 
Francesc Cambó and Joan Ventosa as ministers of Development and Supply respectively. It 
fulfilled the party’s objective to be at the centre of state power.33 It was, therefore, a bitter 
blow to see the implosion of the cabinet due to dynastic squabbling, moreover, initiated by an 
old foe, Santiago Alba, who then obtained the Finance Ministry in the subsequent 
governmental coalition of different factions within the Liberal Party led by Alhucemas.34 
 The armistice in Europe coincided with the fall of Spain’s national government. After 
their disappointing brief spell in office, the Catalanists concluded that if thwarted in their 
efforts to work for a greater Spain, they should strive for an autonomous Catalonia. Accused 
of empty results for all its recent collaborationism, the Lliga could be overtaken by more 
radical nationalists. The objective was to channel the agitation away from subversive paths by 
raising the rhetoric in order to obtain substantial concessions while avoiding a frontal 
collision with the state. 
 The U.S. President Wilson's call for the self-determination of small nations appeared 
to provide a golden opportunity to the Catalan leaders.35 Furthermore, the Lliga had cemented 
close relations with key politicians such as Antonio Maura and Count Romanones during 
their collaboration in office. From Catalan-speaking Mallorca, Maura favoured administrative 
decentralization and enjoyed the friendship of many Catalanist leaders.36 With the Liberal 
Party broken into rival factions, Romanones viewed Cambó as an ally against rivals such as 
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Alba and Alhucemas.37 The Lliga could apparently also rely on the sympathy of a grateful 
monarch. The Catalanists had kept channels open with the throne during the turbulent days of 
1917.38 One year later, King Alfonso XIII, worried by the situation in Europe, promised 
Cambó his support for autonomy as a bulwark against revolution in Catalonia.39 However, as 
in 1917, fear of labour agitation prevailed over reformist ideals. 
 On 16 November, the campaign masterminded by the Lliga properly kicked off with a 
well-choreographed display. Defying the heavy rain, a large demonstration went to Plaça de 
Sant Jaume, the site of the Mancomunitat, to petition that body to lead the struggle for 
autonomy. Previously, questionnaires sent to all Catalan town councils by the Mancomunitat 
had returned 98 per cent of responses in favour of home rule.40 Left-wing parties rapidly 
jumped on the bandwagon. Even the hitherto rabid anti-Catalanist Lerroux, agreed to work 
for a republic that would grant autonomy to Catalonia.41 On 20 November, in a packed 
chamber, Cambó formally petitioned for self-government. He concluded that Catalan 
nationalism was a biological fact that summed up the will of the Catalan people.42 Nine days 
later, a Mancomunitat representation, headed by Puig i Cadafalch asked Prime Minister 
Alhucemas the concession of a statute of autonomy.43 On 3 December, the Lliga obtained its 
first victory: Romanones, foreign minister in the government, opposed to Alhucemas’s 
inflexible stance, was entrusted by the king to form a government restricted to his faction. 
 Romanones was willing to tackle the question through negotiation. In his notes, he 
mentions the example of the British Home Rule Bill for Ireland of 1914.44 However, he was 
confronted by hostile campaigns such as that led by the Círculo de la Unión Mercantil e 
Industrial de Madrid (close to Alba) demanding a boycott of Catalan products. Across the 
country, economic bodies and provincial councils denounced the tariff barriers that secured 
Catalan control over Spanish markets. Also, academic authorities organized an avalanche of 
acts stressing the sacrosanct unity of Spain.45 The Lliga also faced an uphill battle in 
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parliament. Cambó described separatism as a folly and used his own example in government 
as proof of noble intentions. However, a Liberal notable, Niceto Alcalá Zamora,46 hit at 
Cambo’s contradictory ambition: being both Simón Bolivar in Catalonia and Bismarck in 
Spain. A lethal blow came unexpectedly from Maura: his calls for compromise, when 
combined with allusions to the invulnerability of the motherland, triggered patriotic outcries. 
The Catalanists withdrew from parliament the following morning.47 
 Back in Barcelona, Cambó raised the stakes when he declared on 16 December 1918: 
‘What shall we choose? A Monarchy? A Republic? No, Catalonia!’48 It was a masterstroke to 
put pressure upon government and throne.49 Romanones, showing his goodwill rapidly 
accepted Cambó’s advice of establishing, by royal decree, an extra-parliamentary 
commission (composed of 33 leading politicians from all parties, including a generous 
Catalan contingent) to produce a draft for Catalan self-government.50 However, the refusal by 
the left-wing parties to take their seats produced a difficult dilemma. Staying out denied the 
Lliga a voice in the proceedings but participation would split the pro-autonomy coalition. 
After agonising hesitations, solidarity with its partners prevailed.51 A bewildered Romanones 
asked Cambó what he was then supposed to do.52 
 More worrying for the government was the attitude of the army. As street clashes 
mounted in Barcelona between autonomists and centralists, Civil Governor Carlos González 
Rothwos was instructed to avoid any type of provocation. But, incensed by what they 
perceived as separatist insults to the dignity of the motherland, officers joined the newly-
emerged Patriotic League and, often in civilian dress, took part in violent brawls. On 16 
January 1919, overwhelmed by the apocalyptic messages of Barcelona’s captain general, 
Joaquín Milans del Bosch, the government suspended constitutional guarantees. One month 
later, Milans played a leading role in the merger of Catalan monarchists into the Unión 
Monárquica Nacional (UMN) led by the industrialist Alfonso Sala to attract a sizeable 
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conservative constituency weary of the political radicalization brought about by the autonomist 
campaign.53 
 In January, two completed autonomy drafts differed greatly but a compromise was not 
impossible. The one endorsed by the extra-parliamentary commission agreed to the equal 
official status of Castilian and Catalan in education and the establishment of an elected body. 
However, heavyweights such as Alba and Alcalá Zamora ensured the elimination of all 
references to sovereignty and emphasized the idea of municipal autonomy with power resting 
in a government-appointed figure. The Catalan statute (approved in a plebiscite by 1,046 out 
of 1,072 Catalan municipal councils) sought under the Lliga’s leadership to avoid a total 
rupture and so rejected the federal character wanted by the republicans. It accepted a Madrid-
appointed Governor-General but stressed its sovereignty to deal with internal matters and the 
existence of an executive responsible to a Catalan legislative.54 
 When parliament reconvened in late January, Cambó recognized the error of not 
participating in the extra-parliamentary commission but warned of the perils of ignoring 
Catalonia’s will.55 At this stage, the Lliga’s plans included a popular referendum in Catalonia, 
which if obstructed would lead Catalan parliamentarians to renounce their seats and 
municipal councils to resign as a sign of civil disobedience.56 The idea was to force a friendly 
government and monarch to concede autonomy by royal decree. As Moreno Luzón notes, 
that strategy rested on an apparent contradiction: claiming to head a democratic movement 
yet settling the question by the direct intervention of the monarchy.57 However, the autonomy 
question suddenly vanished from the spotlight. 
III. The Voice of the Disenfranchised 
The Lliga’s claim to speak for Catalonia was hollow. Its pretended project of social 
cohesiveness only represented the interests of the gent de bé (the good citizens from the 
middle/upper class strata). It, certainly, did not speak for the proletariat.58 
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 Barcelona encapsulated the tensions of economic modernization. It possessed a 
powerful bourgeoisie, a radicalized workers’ movement and a restless local garrison: all 
sharing a mistrust of a distant central administration. The Great War’s socio-economic 
dislocation set the powder-keg alight. 
 No other Spanish city experienced during the war such a disparity between bourgeois 
opulence and proletarian gloom. Industrial barons and businessmen enjoyed a golden era. 
Simultaneously, the rising prices of staple goods and rents plunged workers into desperate 
conditions. The boom also accelerated the process by which class divisions became inscribed 
in urban space.59 The Eixample, a quarter celebrated for its dazzling architecture and 
fashionable shops, experienced construction fever as la gent de bé set up their offices and 
build spacious houses which enjoyed all the modern amenities. It was a brutal contrast to the 
squalor of the Ciutat Vella (old town) and the peripheral municipalities (Les Corts de Sarrià, 
Sants, Gràcia, etc.), which additionally experienced an avalanche of poor Spanish peasants 
lured by the industrial expansion. Barcelona’s population grew from 587,000 to 710,000 
between 1910 and 1920.60 Landlords maximized profits out of the lack of habitable space 
with sky-rocketing rents which increased 255.6 per cent between 1913 and 1921. Derelict old 
buildings were subdivided to accommodate several families. Tenants were also crammed in 
barracas (shanty buildings) made of cardboard and scrap metal. Sometimes, beds were 
available on hourly rates in real doss houses.61 
 Barcelona was ahead of other capitals in terms of strike action. Its peak was reached 
in 1919-20 when the inflationary trend coincided with the contraction of markets.62 Dismal 
working conditions and depressed earnings provided a crucial impetus to the process of class 
identity. However, unlike most European countries, it was not Marxism but the anarcho-
syndicalist Confederación Nacional del Trabajo (CNT) that channelled labour agitation. Less 
homogeneous than its rival the socialist Unión General de Trabajadores (UGT), the CNT 
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was a broad church in which different currents converged. They all shared disdain for 
bureaucracy and parliamentarian politics, placed emphasis on the socio-economic struggle 
and aimed to create an aggressive movement which, unlike the UGT, would not shrink from 
using the general strike to achieve specific industrial demands and carry out the social 
revolution. The CNT’s attempt to convert alienation into action seemed more appropriate, in 
the conflictive Catalan milieu, than the UGT’s gradualist strategy. Firm-believers in the self-
expression of the masses, anarcho-syndicalist grass-roots popularity multiplied as its district 
committees tapped into the largely spontaneous consumption protests and rent strikes.63 
Unlike the socialists who distinguished between the revolutionary and the ‘criminal’, the 
CNT emphasized the inalienable right of the needy to secure their existence by whatever 
means they saw fit and was open to all the ‘have nots’ to articulate their grievances and 
combat the ‘haves’ (employers, landlords, police, shopkeepers, etc.) and.64 
 During the Great War, the so-called action groups re-emerged to co-ordinate the 
pickets and fight police and strike-breaking labour. Some offered violent but quick solutions 
to pending social conflicts. Winning concessions from hitherto stubborn employers through 
terrorism encouraged some unions to pay special dues for services rendered.65 Still, 
fundamental to the expansion of the CNT in Catalonia was the rise of a team of labour 
activists led by the charismatic Salvador Seguí. Their efforts to build a powerful movement 
culminated with the establishment of the Sindicatos Únicos during a regional congress (28 
June-1 July 1918). These were modern industrial unions which grouped the entire workforce 
into 13 sectors and thus ended the craft divisions that hitherto had limited proletarian 
solidarity. They were decentralised and elected their own representatives to the local 
federations which, in turn, appointed regional committees which were loosely associated into 
a national confederation.66 Union activists collaborated with a number of libertarian veterans 
who arrived in Barcelona during the war years and whose propaganda activities secured their 
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rapid rise to the CNT’s national committees and editorship of major publications: For 
instance, the Andalusian Francisco Jordán and the Aragonese Manuel Buenacasa (general 
secretaries, August 1916-February 1917 and August 1918-January 1919, respectively); the 
Leonese Angel Pestaña (editor of the CNT’s mouthpiece Solidaridad Obrera in 1917); and 
Paulino Díez, born in Burgos (secretary of the local federation of unions of Barcelona in 
January 1919).67 
 The CNT capitalized upon the euphoria triggered by the November Revolution. The 
fall of tsarist Russia, followed by the Bolshevik take-over struck as much terror into the 
hearts of the dominant classes as it raised expectations amongst the workers. However, the 
socialists, traumatized by their ill-fated insurrectionary experience of 1917, were weary to 
embark upon any new revolutionary adventure. By contrast, anarcho-syndicalist quarters 
greeted the news with unrestrained enthusiasm. Solidaridad Obrera claimed it was showing 
the path to follow.68 Obviously, their anti-statism was a world apart from the authoritarian 
tenets of Leninism. Yet, blinded by optimism and ideological ignorance, Bolshevism 
appeared to them as a new faith which vindicated their own vision of revolutionary 
spontaneity (workers’ control and land redistribution).69 Two of its leading activists stressed 
this mythical approach: Manuel Buenacasa claimed that the Bolshevik was for them a demi-
God and Ángel Pestaña noted how Russia was the new holy land.70 
 Throughout 1918, the Bolshevik example combined with dwindling workers’ living 
standards resulted in growing industrial strife while the southern countryside experienced 
mass revolt. By early 1919, the government was overwhelmed by the Catalan employers’ 
constant demands for punitive measures against the unions and the deterioration of public 
order due to the question of Catalan home rule. Caught between its desire to find a 
compromise with an autonomist movement that contained powerful economic interests and 
the need to appease the local garrison, it chose to suspend constitutional guarantees, on 16 
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January 1919, and direct the repressive backlash against the CNT, although it had not 
participated in the autonomist disturbances and even declared its neutrality in what it 
considered a mere bourgeois affair.71 The workers’ press and centres were shut down and 
some of its leaders interned in the warship Pelayo. The CNT’s response swept the autonomy 
dispute from the agenda. 
 In February 1919, a conflict broke out in Barcelona's Traction, Light and Power 
Company, an Anglo-Canadian hydro-electrical concern and main supplier of the city (known 
as La Canadiense). The company's intransigence towards its staff’s union membership 
became a protracted struggle of 44 days between the employers, backed by the civilian and 
military authorities and the British embassy, and the workers.72 
 On 2 February, eight employees were sacked for trying to establish a union. Three 
days later, their section colleagues staged a go-slow, demanding the right of union affiliation 
and calling on the president of the Mancomunitat, Civil Governor Carlos González Rothwos 
and the mayor of Barcelona, Antonio Martínez Domingo, to mediate. Their demands 
included no management reprisals, the return of the evicted workers and wage increases. 
Despite initial promises made by the civil governor, the police moved to evict those involved 
in the ‘go-slow’. In turn, the English manager Fraser Lawton sacked all striking workers. His 
stance was backed by Rothwos73 and General Milans. Simultaneously, the British embassy 
was urging the government to take stern measures against the ‘troublemakers’. The workers 
replied by taking their plea to the CNT’s Único of Gas, Water and Electricity. 
 The dispute welded the population into an unprecedented display of working-class 
solidarity: some 185,000 pesetas were collected for imprisoned comrades, 31,000 for the 
Canadiense workers, 131,000 for other strikers and 81,000 for propaganda.74 A strike 
committee including members of different sectors, headed by the president of the building 
workers, Simó Piera, led the struggle. Aiming at hitting the company where it hurt most, its 
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revenue, it ordered an end to reading meters and sending out bills. On 12 February, the only 
collector prepared to perform his duties (a certain Joaquín Baró) was shot dead. The 
Mancomunitat president met the members of the strike committee but Puig i Cadafalch only 
managed to offend them when he sought to divert the movement into support for Catalan 
autonomy, especially since they were aware how the Lliga was lobbying in Madrid for harsh 
measures against the unions. On 17 February, as Lawton refused to meet with a workers’ 
delegation because it contained a member of the CNT who was not employed by the 
company, some 20,000 textile workers stopped work. On 21 February, the strike committee 
extended the conflict to other electricity companies and the tram service. With Barcelona 
plunged into darkness, Romanones announced the take-over of the company with the prior 
permission of the British embassy. The military corps of engineers managed to re-establish 
electric services. But, by the end of the month, gas and water workers joined the strike. Over 
70 per cent of industry was paralysed. 
 In early March, the government heeded General Milans’s appeal to militarize public 
services. Drafting all workers of military age (men aged 21-31) meant that they could be 
court-martialled if they ignored orders to return to work (3,000 were eventually arrested). In 
an outstanding display of power, the Único of Graphic Arts introduced ‘red censorship’, that 
is the prevention of any publication hostile to the workers' position (including military 
decrees). On 12 March, under pressure from the captain general, the government agreed to 
declare martial law. Yet, to Milans’s chagrin (who threatened to resign), the government had 
already opted for conciliation. The southern countryside was in revolt, food riots affected 
several cities and the UGT, after weeks of hesitations, threatened a nationwide strike of 
solidarity.75 It appointed as civil governor Carlos Montañés, a former engineer at the 
Canadiense liked by the workers, and a new head of police, Gerardo Doval. Additionally, the 
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Cabinet Secretary, José Morote, arrived in Barcelona with special powers. On 17 March, both 
sides accepted a compromise. 
 Ironically, the labour leaders ran into difficulties selling the settlement to the rank-
and-file. On 19 March, a crowd of some 20,000 euphoric workers gathered at Las Arenas 
bull-ring. The members of the strike committee were booed while trying to explain the deal 
reached with the authorities. Speaking last, Seguí managed to sway the masses. Faced with 
complaints that some militants were still imprisoned, he offered the crowd the choice of 
behaving with serenity and waiting for three days to see if the authorities fulfilled their 
promises or marching towards the dreaded castle of Monjuïtch where their comrades were 
jailed.76 Seguí’s Pyrrhic victory not only revealed a deep chasm between the pragmatic 
leadership and the extremists but also by offering a deadline he had provided its enemies with 
a golden opportunity to strike back. 
 As in the issue of autonomy, the government ultimately opted for conciliation. The 
company agreed to accept the re-hiring of its discharged employees (without penalties of any 
kind), to raise salaries and to reimburse a fortnight’s pay in February and a full month’s 
wages for the days of March lost during the dispute. In turn, the government promised an 
amnesty for all those imprisoned and introduced far-reaching social measures such as an 
eight-hour working day in the construction sector (with legislation promised to extend it to all 
industry), the first government in Europe to do so.77 
IV. Reaction on the March 
The Bolsheviks argued that the fulfilment by the Russian workers of their ‘historical mission’ 
was intended to trigger off a world-wide revolution.78 From autumn 1918, events seemed to 
confirm their claims. Soldiers and workers’ revolts brought to an abrupt end the German and 
Austrian Empires. A myriad of revolutionary committees sprang up to fill the power vacuum 
in central Europe. The Bolsheviks founded in March 1919 the Third International (Comintern) 
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to co-ordinate the diverse revolutionary efforts. Yet, a bizarre outcome of the November 
Revolution was that it initiated an era of virtually uninterrupted working class defeats. 
Bolshevik bluster added to widespread labour agitation caused panic amongst broad social 
sectors. Fearing that the natural order was imperilled, bourgeois militias sprang up and 
emergency legislation to eradicate the spectre of communism was introduced.79 Instead of an 
age of international revolution, the events of the spring of 1919 in Barcelona formed part of 
the first wave of anti-liberal reaction that marked the interwar period. 
 By early 1919, constant reports of upheaval across the continent combined with the 
upsurge of industrial and rural strife at home set alarm bells ringing amongst the Spanish 
ruling classes. In a mood verging on paranoia, Moscow’s hand was perceived behind every 
social dispute. The Catholic mouthpiece, El Debate, warned that there were 100,000 Soviet 
agents in Barcelona. Even the normally sober El Sol claimed that Lenin had landed in the 
Catalan capital to lead a revolution! Joaquín Nadal, a Catalan monarchist, wrote that the 
hysteria was such that it appeared as if the Russians had already seized the district of Sants in 
Barcelona.80 Within these parameters, the outcome of the Canadiense proved a watershed. 
The government’s conciliatory formula appalled both the Catalan gent de bé and the local 
garrison. Catalan right-wing newspapers argued that the government had deserted the citizens 
of order. Some in Madrid suggested, for the first time, that only a dictatorship could save the 
country.81 
 The Catalan bourgeoisie perceived its world being turned upside down. It was not the 
violence of the strike, nor any revolutionary demands (the workers had settled for the 
improvement of working conditions and wages) which frightened them but the unprecedented 
labour organization that they equated to Bolshevism.82 The Fomento del Trabajo Nacional 
(FTN), the Catalan employers’ leading association, called the events, ‘a macabre film’: after 
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troublemakers left the city without water, light and transport, the government rewarded those 
criminals with an eight-hour working day.83 
 Feeling abandoned by the state, Catalan industrialists agreed to put aside divisive 
issues and defend their corporate interests. They created their own organ of combat: the 
Confederación Patronal Española (CPE). Established at a congress in Madrid in September 
1914, the CPE was led by hard-liners, often from the construction sector. Its most powerful 
branch, the Barcelona Federation (re-structured in March 1919) was established, in its own 
words, to battle that ‘insatiable beast fed on collective misery’, the Sindicato Único.84 
Structured like its class enemies with local federations integrated into regional bodies, its 
members were encouraged to take insurance policies against violent death and ‘unfair’ 
strikes, compile blacklists and raise special funds to finance non-unionised labour and 
lockouts.85 Magda Sellés believed that a certain rivalry over strategy and hegemony remained 
between the Catalan grand bourgeoisie’s traditional body (FTN) and the CPE. However, 
ample evidence reveals that they shared the same objectives: to fight the perceived 
revolutionary threat and the sindicalización forzosa (compulsory unionization) of both 
workers and employers into corporative unions so as to make the CNT redundant. They 
complemented each other. The FTN’s industrial aristocracy continued to act as a formidable 
pressure group while the dirty business of facing the CNT head-on was left to the CPE.86 
 The Catalan employers sought guidance in the local garrison. Having witnessed 
Madrid’s feeble response to social unrest and attacks on the unity of the motherland, the 
officers were ready to step in. Aware that the fragile social truce rested on the sensitive 
question of the jailed militants, the army’s refusal to comply, in open defiance to the 
government’s instructions, re-ignited the conflict.87 El Sol noted how a power operating in the 
shadows left civil authority in the gutter.88 
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 On 24 March, the CNT declared a general strike.89 The workers responded with the 
discipline of the earlier dispute. Barcelona was again brought to a standstill. This time, 
however, employers and garrison, working in tandem, were prepared. Without consulting 
Madrid, General Milans re-imposed martial law. A bewildered government had to follow suit 
and suspend constitutional guarantees across the country. Manuel Bravo Portillo, a former 
police chief, disgraced due to his pro-German spy activities, recruited a gang amongst ex-
policemen and underworld thugs to act as the employers’ private force, engaging in a dirty 
war with the CNT which included arrests, beatings and, occasionally, the murder of labour 
leaders.90 Portillo also helped re-organize the Somatén. A medieval body that had 
metamorphosed into a rural force to suppress banditry, the Somatén was an early example of 
the counter-revolutionary militias that emerged then in Europe. Unlike the leading role of 
revolutionary elites in Italian fascism, the Somatén was the armed instrument of Barcelona’s 
bourgeoisie. Tellingly, political rivals such as Cambó and Alfonso Sala, the leader of the 
recently created monarchist UMN, were amongst its initial 8,000 members. Its ranks ranged 
from humble shop-keepers to wealthy industrialists, united by their determination to fight the 
red threat, but the leadership was in the hand of aristocrats (Marquis of Comillas, Count 
Godó and Marquis of Camps) and rich industrialists (such as the leading member of the 
Lliga, Josep Bertrán i Musitu) under the ultimate command of the captain general.91 Financed 
with army funds, the Somatén produced the so-called Fichero Lasarte, named after its keeper 
(the retired captain of the Civil Guard, Julio Lasarte): a card-index of labour activists to 
facilitate their round-up and even assassination.92 
 On 25 March, the Somatén was deployed, for the first time, to break the strike in 
Barcelona. It established a cordon sanitaire around working-class quarters and collaborated 
with troops in arresting trade unionists and forcing shops to remain open. The example of the 
Somatén of Barcelona was swiftly emulated in other Spanish cities.93 Economically 
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exhausted after the Canadiense, labour resistance began to wane. On 7 April, the CNT agreed 
the return to work. This took slightly longer in some industrial sectors due to the CPE’s harsh 
notes which were published in the military’s official bulletins.94 However, the anarcho-
syndicalist movement was still enjoying a golden period. The prestige gained during the 
Canadiense, the widespread social distress and the revolutionary optimism caused by the 
Russian events provided a receptive audience. In December 1919, during its second national 
congress held at the Teatro de la Comedia in Madrid, it claimed 700,000 members, three 
times that of the UGT; ample proof of its hegemony not only in Catalonia but also its 
dominant position in Valencia, Aragón and Andalucía. In an euphoric atmosphere, the CNT 
adopted the structure of the Sindicato Único on a national basis and even voted to join the 
recently created Comintern.95 
 The reactionary counteroffensive initiated in the spring of 1919 not only sought to 
tame the labour movement but also to subvert the constitutional order. Cambó correctly noted 
that the climate of Barcelona paved the road to the military dictatorship. Yet, he apportioned 
blame entirely upon the unions’ disturbances and overlooked the part played by himself, his 
party, the employers and, the army in the regime’s demise.96 During the general strike, the 
government persevered in finding a conciliatory formula. It accelerated legislation for a 
compulsory scheme of workers’ pensions and promised the introduction of the eight-hour 
working day to all industrial sectors from 1 October. However, all attempts to channel the 
conflict into a satisfactory compromise were violently brushed aside.97 The army thwarted the 
requests by Civil Governor Montañés to release some textile union leaders arrested by 
Portillo so as to engage in dialogue. Also General Milans vetoed the efforts of the chief of 
police, Gerardo Doval, to dismantle Portillo’s force. The captain general drafted a harsh note 
of resignation (the second in one month) but stressed that its acceptance would run against 
the wishes of a united garrison. The moment of truth arrived on 14 April: Doval and 
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Montañés were ‘invited’ by the military to catch the train to Madrid. That night Romanones 
resigned. It was in all but name a coup; a dress rehearsal for events four years later.98 
 In the spring of 1919, the perceived revolutionary threat in Spain gave way to an early 
example in Europe of the gradual displacement of authority from the state to ad-hoc 
paramilitary forces. Under the pretext of embodying the defence of social order, an alliance 
between industrialists and the army was concluded. It not only operated independently of the 
government but also began to behave as a veritable `anti-state', thus sealing the organic crisis 
of the Liberal order. The Lliga, fearful of losing its conservative support, put its autonomist 
demands on the back-burner and lent its support to the praetorian-led counteroffensive. 
Cambó even claimed that Catalonia’s survival was at stake.99 Ironically, Catalonia was then 
to enjoy a sort of autonomy: employers and military authorities pursued a road of massive 
social repression independent of, when not openly against, central governments. The ferocity 
of the reaction was such that Antonio Gramsci discerned there the precursor of Italian 
Fascism.100 
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